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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 Allen-Myland, Inc. ("AMI") appeals from the district court's 
judgment in favor of IBM in this intricate antitrust tying case.  
We conclude that the district court erred and will vacate its 
judgment and remand the cause for further proceedings.2 
                     
     1Amici consist of the Computer Dealers and Lessors 
Association, Inc., Digital Dealers Association, and National 
Association of Telecommunications Dealers. 
     2Although upon review we concentrate on errors, it is well 
to say at the outset that in a case that has been litigated as 
vigorously as this one, either finding facts or reviewing those 
findings for clear error is no easy task.  The thirty-volume 
record on appeal contains 17,469 pages of court filings, trial 
and deposition transcripts, and exhibits.  The district court, of 
course, was in even a more difficult position.  Over 3.5 million 
pages of discovery documents were produced and 65 days of 
deposition testimony were taken.  The trial transcript alone 
fills 1,750 pages, there were 2,750 pages of deposition testimony 






 I. FACTS and PROCEDURE 
 A. Mainframes and Upgrades 
 The facts underlying this nine-year-old dispute are minutely 
detailed and quite voluminous.  The district court has set forth 
these facts in great detail in its forty-four page opinion, 
Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 693 F. Supp. 262 (E.D. Pa. 
1988), and we will present only a brief summary here. 
 IBM is the world's largest manufacturer of large-scale 
mainframe computers.  These machines have the capacity to process 
millions of records at a time and manage a tremendous volume of 
information, making modern operations possible for large 
corporations, public utilities and government agencies.  Without 
them, business would soon slow or halt.  Mainframes are 
physically large machines, generally occupying significant floor 
space and requiring a full-time staff to keep them in operation.  
Needless to say, they are quite expensive, with prices commonly 
in excess of $1 million. 
 Mainframes are available in a wide range of computing 
capacities, to fit the needs of each individual customer.  One 
common measure of capacity is computing speed, measured in 
millions of instructions per second ("MIPS").  IBM mainframes may 
also be upgraded, as its customers' computing needs change over 
time, in what is known as a MIPS upgrade. 
 
 
 Many IBM mainframes are not purchased outright from IBM by 
their end users, but are instead leased through third-party 
leasing companies such as CMI and Comdisco.3  A mainframe will 
typically be leased to several end users during its life cycle, 
and then when obsolete will be scrapped.  Often, when the lease 
term expires and the mainframe returns to the lessor, the 
computer will need to be reconfigured to meet the needs of the 
next lessee. 
 Companies like AMI found a profitable market reconfiguring 
mainframe computers such as the IBM 303X series.4  Lessors could 
not afford to have their machines idle and generating no revenue 
while waiting for a reconfiguration, yet IBM often took months to 
install an upgrade.  AMI, on the other hand, would turn the job 
around in a matter of only a few days.  Either AMI or the leasing 
company would buy the required parts outright from IBM for 
inventory on what were known as SWRPQ terms, meaning that IBM 
installation was not included.  It would then install the parts 
in the user's computer, set up the appropriate software and test 
the system.  Old parts could often then be used on another 
computer.  Because the 303X series of computers was based on 
"MST" circuit board technology, which required significant 
technical skill and time to reconfigure, AMI was in a position to 
                     
     3IBM itself is barred from leasing computers to end users 
under the terms of a 1956 consent decree entered into with the 
United States in another antitrust case. 
     4An "X" in an IBM model number indicates that several 




add considerable value in terms of its labor.  As a result, AMI 
grew into a company with $50 million in annual revenue. 
 In 1980, however, IBM introduced its next generation of 
mainframe computers, the 308X series, which caused a major 
erosion in AMI's reconfiguration business.  These machines used a 
new technology, the thermal conduction module, or TCM.  A TCM is 
essentially a water-cooled can containing a much greater density 
of circuits than the system it replaced.  Because more circuitry 
can be placed in a TCM, there are fewer TCMs to replace; hence, 
there is much less labor involved in performing an upgrade on a 
TCM-based computer than on earlier models. 
 In marketing its 308X series, IBM used a policy known as net 
pricing.  Under this policy, IBM installation labor was bundled 
in with the price of the parts for TCM-based MIPS upgrades; SWRPQ 
pricing was either eliminated or was priced prohibitively high.  
In addition, any old TCMs recovered from a mainframe during 
reconfiguration became IBM's property.  As a result, customers 
desiring non-IBM installation of upgrades were required to pay 
IBM's labor charge anyway.  And because the net pricing policy 
limited the supply of the TCMs on the open market, acquiring 
parts from sources other than IBM became impractical. 
 IBM contended that net pricing's purpose was to insure that 
the old TCMs recovered from reconfigured machines were returned 
to IBM.  TCMs are extremely durable and can easily be refurbished 
to "equivalent to new" condition.  IBM, faced with a 
manufacturing capacity shortage, stated that it merely wanted to 
refurbish TCMs that were returned for later reuse in a future 
 
 
upgrade or in a brand-new machine.  As for bundling the labor 
charge, IBM contended its purpose was to ensure that it got its 
TCMs back, which was enhanced when IBM personnel performed the 
labor. 
 B. Procedural History 
 AMI, however, soon found that much of its reconfiguration 
business was drying up and filed this action.  AMI's four-count 
complaint alleged that IBM violated sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, and also asserted state law 
unfair competition and tortious interference claims.  IBM 
counterclaimed for copyright infringement of its software 
programs and documentation manuals; IBM also asserted state law 
counterclaims for breach of contract and tortious interference. 
 AMI's section 1 claim was tried in a bench trial, contending 
that IBM had tied its upgrade installation services to the parts 
needed to perform the upgrades.5  AMI alleged that this tying 
arrangement constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act; 
alternatively, it asserted that the tie was still a section 1 
violation under the rule of reason. 
 The district court found that IBM's net pricing structure 
did not constitute a per se section 1 violation, for two reasons: 
first, that IBM's share of the relevant market was not high 
enough to impose per se liability, id. at 270-83; and second, 
                     
     5In addition, AMI alleged that IBM's Installation and 
Warranty Service Charge (IWSC) constituted an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.  The district court found for IBM on this 
theory, and AMI has not appealed from that finding. 
 
 
that net pricing did not foreclose AMI from a "viable business 
opportunity," id. at 283-93.  The court also found that net 
pricing did not violate section 1 under a rule of reason analysis 
because sufficient procompetitive reasons existed for it.6  Id. 
at 293-98. 
 Later, the district court tried most of the remaining claims 
and counterclaims, and concluded that AMI was liable to IBM for 
copyright infringement and violations of the Lanham Act.  Allen-
Myland, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990).7  
The court also entered judgment for IBM on AMI's Sherman Act 
section 2 claim, concluding that such a claim could not possibly 
succeed unless its earlier ruling on market power were reversed.  
Id. at 525 n.1, 559. 
 Meanwhile, IBM had filed another Lanham Act action against 
AMI in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois, which was transferred to the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania.  Moreover, certain issues concerning IBM's relief 
against AMI on its counterclaims remained unresolved.  On AMI's 
motion, the district court issued an order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(b) declaring that its 1988 opinion resolving the antitrust 
issues constituted a final judgment.  Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM 
Corp., 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 70,244, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 3d  
                     
     6The district court's decision under the rule of reason has 
not been appealed. 
     7AMI later moved for reconsideration, but that motion was 






(Callaghan) 1353, 1993 WL 169849 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 1993).  This 
appeal followed. 
 II. OVERVIEW of the LAW of TYING ARRANGEMENTS 
 The overarching issue in this appeal is AMI's claim that the 
district court erred when it found that net pricing was not a per 
se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  In a tying 
arrangement, the seller sells one item, known as the tying 
product, on the condition that the buyer also purchases another 
item, known as the tied product.  Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. 
v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 475 (3d Cir.) (in banc), 
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 196 (1992).  Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act declares only contracts in restraint of trade illegal.  Thus, 
the antitrust concern over tying arrangements is limited to those 
situations in which the seller can exploit its power in the 
market for the tying product to force buyers to purchase the tied 
product when they otherwise would not, thereby restraining 
competition in the tied product market.  Market power is defined 
as the ability "to raise prices or to require purchasers to 
accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely 
competitive market."  United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner 
Enters., Inc. ("Fortner II"), 429 U.S. 610, 620, 97 S. Ct. 861, 
867-68 (1977). 
 On the other hand, if the seller does not have sufficient 
power in the tying product market, buyers wanting to purchase the 
tied product from another source will simply avoid the tie by 
 
 
buying the tying product from another supplier.  See Town Sound, 
959 F.2d at 476 (discussing Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. 
Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 11-14, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1558-59 (1984)).  Such 
a tie will not restrain an appreciable amount of trade, and 
accordingly, will not constitute an antitrust violation. 
 The first inquiry in any section 1 tying case is whether the 
defendant has sufficient market power over the tying product, 
which requires a finding that two separate product markets exist 
and a determination of precisely what the tying and tied product 
markets are.  See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 21, 104 S. Ct. at 
1562-63.  If the defendant is found to have sufficient market 
power in the tying product market, then the tie may be a "per se" 
violation of the Sherman Act.  This tie is condemned if the 
probability that the contractual arrangement improperly restrains 
trade is so high that a judicial inquiry into the actual 
prevailing market conditions, including possible procompetitive 
justifications for the tie, is deemed unprofitable.  Id. at 15-18 
& n.25, 104 S. Ct. at 1560-61 & n.25; Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 
477. 
 Assuming the court finds sufficient market power, it must 
then decide whether "a substantial amount of interstate commerce" 
has been affected by the tie.  See, e.g., Town Sound, 959 F.2d at 
477.  The Supreme Court has defined "substantial" in absolute 
dollar terms as an amount which is not de minimis in terms of the 
"total volume of sales tied by the sales policy under challenge . 





("Fortner I"), 394 U.S. 495, 501-02, 89 S. Ct. 1252, 1257-58 
(1969) ($190,000 sufficient).   
 Finally, to have standing to bring a private antitrust 
action, the plaintiff must show "fact of damage," defined as some 
harm flowing from the antitrust violation.  Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 89 S. Ct. 1562, 
1571-72 n.9 (1969); Pitchford v. Pepi, Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 98-99 
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935, 96 S. Ct. 2649 
(1976).  The amount of the damage is not important for antitrust 
standing; it is sufficient that some damage has occurred.  There 
must, however, be some causal link between the damage and the 
violation of the antitrust laws.  Put another way, the harm must 
be one that the antitrust laws were designed to prevent.  
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488-89, 
97 S. Ct. 690, 697 (1977). 
 III. SCOPE of the RELEVANT MARKET 
 A. Introduction 
 AMI asserts that the tying product is the "large-scale 
mainframe computer," defined as computers that are "among the 
largest in memory capacity, the fastest in computing speed, and 
the most expensive of computers available."  Allen-Myland, 693 F. 
Supp. at 270-71.  Alternatively, it sets forth two submarkets 
consisting of the parts and services required for the conversion 
and upgrade of either IBM mainframes or all manufacturers' 
mainframes.  AMI defines the tied product as the labor required 
to install upgrades. 
 
 
 The district court found AMI's proposed market definition 
and submarkets to be too narrow.  When the court broadened the 
market to include various substitutes that it believed shared 
cross-elasticity of demand8 with large-scale mainframes, IBM's 
market share dropped from as high as 79% to under 34.4%, too low 
to impose per se liability.  See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 
26-27, 104 S. Ct. at 1566 (30% market share insufficient); Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 611-12, 
73 S. Ct. 872, 882 (1953) (33-40% market share insufficient).  
The court stated: 
 Standing alone, AMI's market share evidence tends to 
show that IBM enjoys substantial economic power.  
However, AMI's definitions of large scale mainframes 
and the relevant market are flawed in several respects 
and tend to overstate IBM's market share and power. 
  
Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 271.  The district court defined 
the relevant market to include not only large-scale mainframes, 
but also added upgrades to large-scale mainframes, leased and 
smaller capacity computers, peripheral products and software, 
"box swaps," and upgrades using customer-provided parts to the 
relevant market.  To the extent that the district court's alleged 
errors were in formulating or applying legal principles, our 
review is, of course, plenary.  We review the district court's 
findings of fact, however, under the clearly erroneous standard 
of review.   
                     
     8 "The outer boundaries of a product market are determined 
by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the 
cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and 
substitutes for it."  Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 




   B. Leasing Companies 
 The district court first added leasing companies into AMI's 
proposed market definition.  It reasoned as follows: 
  Leasing companies, such as Comdisco and CMI, 
purchase computer equipment from manufacturers and 
lease it to users.  From a consumer's standpoint, they 
are an alternative source of computer equipment.  They 
compete with IBM.  Leasing companies own approximately 
40 percent of all large scale mainframe computers, as 
defined by AMI.  Prof. Levin testified that IBM's share 
of the market would be reduced by an amount he was 
unable to determine if leasing companies were taken 
into account in AMI's market definition.  If leasing 
company transactions involving computers comparable and 
in many cases identical to the large scale mainframes 
marketed by IBM are included in the relevant market, 
and the market is measured on a "transaction basis," 
IBM's share of the market, according to Prof. Almarin 
Phillips, who testified for IBM as an expert economist, 
drops to 34.4 percent.  Prof. Phillips testified that 
such a share would not reflect "overwhelming" activity 
in the market on IBM's part. 
 
Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 273-74 (footnote and record 
citations omitted).  We cannot affirm the district court's 
finding that leasing companies form a part of the relevant 
market. 
 First, the district court relied on the testimony of 
Professor Levin, AMI's own expert, as an admission that IBM's 
market share would have to be reduced if leasing companies were 
added to the relevant market.  This reliance is misplaced.  
Although Professor Levin did affirmatively answer the 
tautological question whether "leasing companies are competitors 
of IBM when they market IBM manufactured equipment in competition 




that he neither addressed the issue of market share reduction nor 
made an admission about it. 
 More importantly, we think that the opinion reveals an 
analytical flaw.  Leasing companies lease both new and used 
computers.  They purchase new mainframes from IBM and lease them 
to end users; when the lease term is up, if the mainframe is not 
obsolete and can be leased again, the leasing company will place 
it with another end user.  In addition, leasing companies deal in 
both IBM and non-IBM computers.  There are important legal and 
competitive distinctions between the various types of equipment 
in which the leasing companies deal, so they cannot be lumped 
together. 
 New computers are, of course, already in the relevant market 
as defined by AMI.  It was therefore incorrect to add them in 
again when end users lease new computers rather than purchase 
them outright.  In this situation, leasing companies provide 
nothing more than an alternate way of financing a new computer, 
but do nothing to increase the supply of new machines.  See 
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp. (In re IBM Peripheral EDP 
Devices Antitrust Litig.), 481 F. Supp. 965, 979 (N.D. Cal. 
1979), aff'd, 698 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
955, 104 S. Ct. 370 (1983).  They do not increase the number of 
new mainframes, as leasing companies still must purchase them 
from their manufacturers.  Thus, to the extent that IBM had the 
power to set prices, that power would not be diminished, or at 
 
 
most would only be slightly diminished,9 by its sales to leasing 
companies rather than end users.  Since these purchases are 
already in the relevant market, it was double counting to also 
include them as part of the leasing market.  Cf. id. 
 With respect to leases of used computers, there is a 
significant difference whether those machines were made by IBM or 
by some other manufacturer.  Where used IBM computers are leased, 
we think that United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa"), 
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)10 is apposite.  There, Alcoa 
controlled 90 percent of the market for virgin aluminum ingot.  
It sought to reduce its market share for antitrust purposes by 
arguing that secondary ingot derived from scrap competed with 
virgin ingot for sales.  The court held that because all 
secondary ingot was ultimately derived from virgin ingot, Alcoa, 
by properly exercising its power over the supply of virgin, could 
indirectly control the supply of secondary as well.  Id. at 425. 
                     
     9Conceivably, a few large, sophisticated buyers could place 
certain limits on even a dominant seller's power to set prices.  
There is no evidence that such pressure was applied here. 
     10Although Alcoa was decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, the procedural circumstances 
under which it reached that court give it added weight as 
precedent.  Under the then-existing version of 15 U.S.C. § 29, 
appeals from the decrees of district courts in antitrust cases 
where the United States was a complainant would lie only to the 
Supreme Court.  In Alcoa, however, a sufficient number of 
justices were recused that a quorum could not be obtained; 
accordingly, the Supreme Court, pursuant to the above statute, 
remanded the case to the three most senior judges of the Second 
Circuit: Learned Hand (the author of Alcoa), Augustus N. Hand, 
and Swan.  The Supreme Court itself has recognized the special 
weight of the Alcoa opinion.  See American Tobacco Co. v. United 




 Alcoa's analysis is persuasive.  Indeed, we think the case 
is even stronger here for excluding the secondary market.  
Refined aluminum can be melted down and reused repeatedly, and in 
any event, products made with it may last for decades before they 
are scrapped and the aluminum is recycled.  It therefore may have 
been quite difficult for Alcoa to estimate future supply and 
demand for aluminum ingot over a long period of time with 
sufficient accuracy to maximize its profits by manipulating the 
supply of virgin ingot it produced.  See 2 Phillip Areeda & 
Donald F. Turner, Antitrust Law § 530c (1978). 
 Computers, however, have considerably more limited lives 
than aluminum ingot.  Technology and price/performance ratios 
have been advancing so rapidly in the computer industry that used 
machines cannot be re-leased indefinitely.11  Accordingly, a 
powerful manufacturer like IBM was in a position to maximize its 
profits by carefully controlling the number of mainframes that 
would later appear on the used leasing market.  This is 
particularly true when, as here, that control was enhanced by 
IBM's policy of recapturing old parts that could otherwise have 
                     
     11Moreover, IBM's net pricing and parts recapture policies 
further reduced whatever control the leasing companies might have 
had over the prices of used equipment.  By recapturing old parts 
from upgraded mainframes, IBM effectively curtailed the leasing 
companies' ability to reconfigure their used machines into 
different models that could have competed against IBM's offerings 
over the medium term.  This effect is similar to that caused by 
IBM's past practices of offering tabulating and computer 
equipment only for lease and not for sale.  These practices also 
spawned antitrust litigation, resulting in a 1935 injunction and 
a 1956 consent decree.  See Control Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 306 




been used to extend the useful service lives of existing used 
mainframes by allowing them to be upgraded and placed with new 
customers.  We therefore conclude that the district court erred 
when it added leases of used IBM mainframes into the relevant 
market.12 
 On the other hand, to the extent that leasing companies deal 
in used, non-IBM mainframes that have not already been counted in 
the sales market, these machines belong in the relevant market 
for large-scale mainframe computers.  Unlike IBM, there is no 
allegation that the manufacturers of these computers possess the 
market power to control prices, much less that they would do so 
in concert with IBM.13  When these computers are placed in 
service by leasing companies, they provide an alternative that 
limits IBM's power in the market.14 
                     
     12We also disagree with the district court's view that AMI 
admitted that leasing companies "compete with IBM and constrain 
IBM's ability to set prices or exclude competition in the market 
for new large scale main frame computers."  Allen-Myland, 693 F. 
Supp. at 274.  The district court cited AMI's proposed finding of 
fact 29 in support of its conclusion, but AMI asserted only that 
IBM and lessors compete in the placement of mainframes with end 
users; in other words, IBM installs computers, and so do Comdisco 
and CMI.  This does not constitute an admission on market cross-
elasticity or the scope of the relevant market. 
     13Indeed, the so-called "plug-compatible manufacturers" have 
built their businesses around providing mainframes and 
peripherals compatible with, but in competition with those of 
IBM. 
     14This holds most true for plug-compatible mainframes.  
There is actually a considerable question to what extent non-
compatible computers are a realistic short-run alternative for a 
customer whose computer software and data are tailored to IBM 
mainframes.  We do not reach the issue, however, as Allen-Myland 
is constrained by its own definition of the market as "large 
scale mainframe computers," regardless of manufacturer or 
 
 
 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred when 
it included all leasing company transactions in the relevant 
market.  On remand, the court should include only leases of used, 
non-IBM mainframes and determine the extent to which those leases 
reduce IBM's market share.   
 C. Box Swaps 
 The district court also added "box swaps" -- replacing an 
existing computer with a more powerful, new or used computer -- 
into the relevant market, although it did not calculate the 
degree to which these box swaps eroded IBM's market share.   
 The analytical problem with this finding is similar to the 
error with respect to leasing companies.  To the extent that a 
box swap involves purchasing a new IBM or a new or used non-IBM 
mainframe computer, it constitutes double counting to add box 
swaps to the market because those sales are already included in 
the market definition.  On the other hand, if a used IBM computer 
is used in the swap, then to include that machine in the market 
is incorrect under Alcoa for the same reason it was error to 
include them in the leasing market. 
 D. Used Parts Upgrades 
 Including "used parts upgrades" in the relevant market was 
also error.  A used parts upgrade is an upgrade performed with 
parts obtained from another computer, either one belonging to the 
                                                                  
compatibility.  See Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, 
Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 117 (3d Cir. 1980) (antitrust plaintiff held 
to theory advanced in district court), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 
911, 101 S. Ct. 1981 (1981). 
 
 
organization needing the upgrade or one belonging to a leasing 
company.  See Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 277.  
 The district court correctly recognized that the viability 
of used parts upgrades could be limited by the scarcity of the 
necessary parts.  It then relied on the many memory and channel 
upgrades and downgrades that had been performed with used parts 
not acquired from IBM.  The record indicates, however, that most 
memory and channel upgrade parts are not based on TCM technology 
and were thus not subject to IBM's net pricing and parts 
recapture policies.  The parts required for MIPS upgrades, 
however, were mostly TCM-based and subject to net pricing and 
recapture.  Thus, that other non-net priced parts were readily 
available does not support the implicit conclusion that there was 
no scarcity of MIPS upgrade parts. 
 Even if used parts were available to perform MIPS upgrades, 
the record does not suggest any manufacturer of those parts other 
than IBM.  Hence, the reasoning of Alcoa is as controlling here 
as it was for used IBM computers.  To the extent that IBM 
controls the supply and price of the new mainframes from which 
upgrade parts must be salvaged, it has the power to indirectly 
control those upgrades as well.  Accordingly, it would have been 
error to include used parts upgrades in the relevant market even 
if parts had been available. 
 E. Smaller Capacity Computers 
 The district court considered AMI's proposed market 
definition to be too narrow because it failed to include "smaller 
capacity computers" -- computers below the size and 
 
 
sophistication of a large-scale mainframe that nevertheless would 
be reasonable substitutes, either singly or in combination.  See 
Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 274-75.  AMI argues that it was 
error for the district court to include these smaller machines 
because there was not sufficient evidence of substitutability 
between these two types of computers.  The district court 
rejected AMI's argument, citing evidence that smaller computers 
had effectively displaced mainframes in certain applications and 
noting a trend toward the replacement of large, centralized 
systems with "distributed" systems consisting of greater numbers 
of smaller capacity computers.  Id. 
 AMI argues on appeal that this reasoning was flawed because 
it failed to consider the rapid development of technology over 
the life cycle of a typical computer.  It agrees that some 
installations that initially required older generation mainframes 
might be satisfied with "smaller" machines when it came time to 
replace their mainframes, because the smaller machines would by 
then have all the power of the earlier mainframes.  Nevertheless, 
AMI contends, the fact that some users of older mainframe 
computers might switch to smaller capacity machines proves 
nothing about whether those smaller machines effectively compete 
against IBM's current, more powerful mainframes, which are the 
focus of this litigation.  AMI's argument is sound, but 
unavailing. There was testimony admitted at trial indicating that 
at least one smaller capacity computer, the Hewlett-Packard HP 
3000 series, competed against the IBM 308X series "in many 
 
 
applications."  The district court was entitled to, and did, 
credit this evidence.  Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 275. 
 The amici argue that the district court failed to consider 
the problem of "lock-in."  Although mainframes and smaller 
capacity computers may be substitutable when a new computer 
application is being developed or when an existing application is 
no longer useful and must be rewritten anyway, they argue that 
there are significant switching costs that prevent this from 
happening in the short run.  For example, to "port" an existing 
application from a mainframe to a smaller computer, the 
applications software may have to be rewritten, the data files 
may have to be converted to new formats, and personnel may have 
to be extensively trained on the new system.  The costs of doing 
so and the delay involved could well cause the computer user to 
remain with a mainframe-based system rather than convert to a 
smaller computer; indeed, one court has noted that, for 
compatibility reasons, over 80 percent of users remain loyal to 
the manufacturer of their original systems.  See Transamerica, 
481 F. Supp. at 980 & n.32. 
 Ordinarily, we would not consider this argument because it 
was not raised in the district court.  This case, however, is 
unusual in that the district court reached its decision in 1988, 
but the antitrust issues did not become final and appealable 
until 1993.  During that hiatus, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 
504 U.S. ____, 112 S. Ct. 2072 (1992).  Because Kodak is directly 
relevant to the lock-in argument and the district court never had 
 
 
the opportunity to consider the effect of that case, we would be 
remiss if we did not analyze the issue now. 
 Eastman Kodak manufactured photocopying equipment that it 
sold in a competitive market.  According to the plaintiffs, who 
provided service and repair to those copiers, Kodak sought to 
maintain control over service by restricting the availability of 
necessary repair parts.  Although Kodak argued that it did not 
have sufficient market power to restrain trade because the market 
for new copiers was competitive, the Supreme Court held that, 
under certain circumstances, the fact that the buyer of such 
equipment was locked into a single supplier could give rise to a 
finding of market power: 
 If the cost of switching is high, consumers who already 
have purchased the equipment, and are thus "locked-in," 
will tolerate some level of service-price increases 
before changing equipment brands.  Under this scenario, 
a seller profitably could maintain supracompetitive 
prices in the aftermarket if the switching costs were 
high relative to the increase in service prices, and 
the number of locked-in customers were high relative to 
the number of new purchasers. 
 
Id. at 2087. 
 The situation may be analogous here.  If it is prohibitively 
expensive to switch to a smaller capacity computer before the 
normal end of an application system's life cycle, then IBM, at 
least for those locked-in customers, would not face any realistic 
competition from smaller machines and would thus possess market 
power as if they did not exist. 
 The district court cited several anecdotes in the record 
suggesting that smaller machines are vigorously competing with 
 
 
large-scale mainframes and are often winning out over them.  Our 
review of the record, however, shows that in none of the 
incidents mentioned was there a mainframe user with a significant 
base of applications software and data that would have to be 
rewritten and converted before the application could be moved to 
a smaller computer.  Indeed, in the vast majority of cases, the 
customer was developing a new application and had an unfettered 
choice of which type of computer to purchase.  In a few others, 
the system was approaching the end of its useful life and was 
slated for replacement.  This evidence, then, does not support 
the conclusion that there was not a significant lock-in problem. 
 Nevertheless, this remains an issue of fact for the district 
court to resolve in the first instance.  However, whether to 
consider new issues on remand is not for us to determine, but is 
properly a matter for the district court's discretion as presider 
over subsequent proceedings.  Therefore, we express no view on 
whether the district court should permit a new argument to be 
pursued at this stage of the litigation.  The district court may 
conclude, for example, that allowing AMI to pursue a new theory 
not raised until after discovery and the completion of an entire 
trial would result in undue prejudice to IBM.  See Habecker v. 
Clark Equipment Co., 942 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1991).  We hold 
only that the determination whether to consider the lock-in 
argument, to permit further discovery on the issue, and to hear 
 
 
additional evidence are all within the district court's sound 
discretion.15  See id. 
 F. Peripheral Devices and Software 
 AMI also argues that the district court erred when it added 
peripheral devices and software into the relevant market.  The 
court found that these items, which provide data input, storage 
and output capabilities and direct the computer in its processing 
of information, "provided significant and reasonable alternatives 
to a wide variety of upgrades and modifications of large scale 
mainframes."  Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 276. 
 Similar or substitute products are those that "have the 
ability -- actual or potential -- to take significant amounts of 
business away from each other."  SmithKline Corp. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co., 575 F.2d 1056, 1063 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 838, 
99 S. Ct. 123 (1978).  Thus, the relevant product market "is 
composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability for 
                     
     15If it does so, the district court should then proceed to 
determine the percentage of the mainframe market occupied by 
existing mainframe users who are locked in to that type of 
computer by prohibitively high switching costs; the greater that 
percentage is, the more power IBM has to maintain 
supracompetitive prices in the mainframe market.  See Phillip E. 
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 521.1a, at 604-05 
(1993 Supp.).  The court can then determine if IBM's power in the 
large-scale mainframe market is constrained by the existence of 
smaller capacity computers, and if so, whether such computers 
should be included in the relevant market.  It may be that the 
district court will conclude that, while smaller capacity 
computers cannot be fully excluded from the market, neither can 
they be fully included.  The court may, after considering the 
evidence and the nature of the market, exercise its discretion 
and reduce IBM's market share by a number greater than zero 




the purposes for which they are produced -- price, use and 
qualities considered."  Id. at 1062-63 (quoting United States v. 
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404, 76 S. Ct. 994, 
1012 (1956) (The Cellophane Case)); Tunis Bros. Co. v. Ford Motor 
Co., 952 F.2d 715, 722 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
3034 (1992). 
 "Interchangeability" implies that one product is roughly 
equivalent to another for the use to which it is put; while there 
might be some degree of preference for the one over the other, 
either would work effectively.  A person needing transportation 
to work could accordingly buy a Ford or a Chevrolet automobile, 
or could elect to ride a horse or bicycle, assuming those options 
were feasible.  The key test for determining whether one product 
is a substitute for another is whether there is a cross-
elasticity of demand between them: in other words, whether the 
demand for the second good would respond to changes in the price 
of the first.  Tunis Bros., 952 F.2d at 722. 
 In the six years since the district court issued its 
opinion, the personal computer has consolidated its position in 
modern life, and what once seemed mired in impenetrable technical 
jargon is now within the vocabulary of the general public.  
Moreover, technology changes rapidly and if one has an older 
computer and wishes to use the latest software applications, one 
often must either upgrade the central processor -- the equivalent 
of a MIPS upgrade -- or buy a new computer.  Increasing the size 
of the disk drive, buying more memory or installing the latest 
version of the operating system may help in some cases but in 
 
 
many others will be ineffective.  It thus may be argued that the 
same situation obtains in the case of larger computers; that is,  
peripherals and software are complementary goods but are not 
substitutes for mainframe computers. 
 The issue, nevertheless, remains a factual one for the 
district court to resolve.  Here, if peripherals and software are 
reasonable substitutes for mainframes, we should expect to see an 
increased demand for them as the price of mainframes rises, but 
the district court cited no evidence of this type.  Instead, it 
relied on the fact that IBM considers peripheral products and 
software when pricing its computer systems.  Allen-Myland, 693 F. 
Supp. at 276.  Pricing a large mainframe system on the basis of 
peripherals included with it against competitive offerings by 
other manufacturers, however, is simply not evidence that 
peripherals and mainframes are substitutes for one another. 
 The district court relied even more heavily on several 
anecdotes in which large mainframe users had upgraded memory, 
disks, software or other peripherals rather than perform a MIPS 
upgrade.  Id. at 276-77.  This testimony fell into two 
categories.  First, some users testified that it was possible to 
delay a MIPS upgrade for a while by upgrading peripherals or 
software: akin perhaps to saying that installing new brakes may 
delay the necessity of purchasing a new car, but it is not 
sufficient evidence on which to conclude that the products are 
reasonably interchangeable in use.  See Kaiser Aluminum & 
Chemical Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 652 F.2d 1324, 1331-32 
(7th Cir. 1981) ("specialties," which delayed the necessity of 
 
 
replacing refractory bricks in furnaces, did not belong in the 
same relevant market). 
 Second, there was testimony to the effect that there are 
many ways to enhance the performance of a computer system, 
including MIPS upgrades and peripheral/software upgrades.  
Although it is doubtless true that improvements to peripherals or 
software will improve a computer's performance somewhat under 
certain circumstances, we find no evidence on how much or under 
what conditions improvement could be expected.  There was thus no 
evidence from which to conclude whether peripheral and software 
upgrades were reasonably interchangeable with either a MIPS 
upgrade or a different mainframe computer in enough cases that 
those alternate upgrades could properly be termed substitutes.  
Nor was there evidence that, because of a price change in 
mainframes, there was a greater or lesser demand for 
peripheral/software upgrades.  In sum, the evidence was 
insufficient to support the wholesale inclusion of peripherals 
and software into the relevant market for large-scale mainframes. 
 We emphasize, however, that we are not holding that 
peripheral and software must be excluded from the relevant 
market, only that, upon review, the evidence cited in the 
district court's opinion is insufficient to warrant including 
them.  On remand, the district court will of course determine 
whether there is some degree of interchangeability or other 
evidence of cross-elasticity of demand.  If there is, then the 
court is free to adjust IBM's share of the market by its best 
estimate of the true competition from peripherals and software. 
 
 
 G. AMI's Proposed Submarkets 
 As a separate ground for reversal, AMI argues that the 
district court erred by rejecting its two alternate submarkets: 
the parts and services required for the upgrade and conversion of 
all large-scale mainframes, and an even narrower submarket 
confined to parts for upgrading IBM mainframes.  The district 
court rejected the larger submarket based on evidence that 
upgrades to large-scale mainframes competed with various 
alternatives, including large-scale mainframes themselves.  
Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 282-83.  It rejected the narrow 
submarket because "[c]ourts have generally rejected market 
definitions limited to a defendant's products."  Id. at 282 n.43. 
 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325, 82 S. 
Ct. 1502, 1524 (1962), the Supreme Court stated that within a 
broader product market "well-defined submarkets may exist which, 
in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust 
purposes."16  Thus, if upgrades and mainframes are not reasonably 
interchangeable with each other, a valid submarket would exist 
here.  The district court, however, found that replacing the 
                     
     16The use of the term "submarket" is somewhat confusing, and 
tends to obscure the true inquiry: whether IBM is constrained by 
the prices of large scale mainframe computers when pricing its 
upgrades.  If it is so constrained, then the relevant market 
consists of both mainframes and upgrades.  If not, then it is 
simpler and more accurate to say that the relevant market itself, 
not some submarket of it, contains only upgrades.  See Areeda & 
Hovenkamp, supra, ¶ 581.1c, at 535-36 (1993 Supp.).  
Nevertheless, because the term has been commonly used in the 
reported cases over the years, we will also continue to use it, 
being nonetheless mindful that it is inaccurate and of the true 
question before us. 
 
 
computer itself is an alternative to an upgrade.  Moreover, it 
found that IBM priced upgrades and mainframes so that buyers 
would be indifferent whether to purchase an upgrade or install a 
more powerful computer.  These factual findings are not disputed 
on appeal, and so the district court's conclusion on the larger 
submarket must stand.  By implication, if the broader submarket 
fails, the narrower one would appear to fail as well. 
 Instead of arguing that the district court's factfinding was 
clearly erroneous, AMI attempts to revive its narrow submarket by 
relying on the testimony of its expert, Professor Levin, that 
certain IBM mainframe users were locked into upgrading their 
computers and lacked the alternative of replacing the whole 
machine.  By so arguing, it attempts to bring this issue within 
the ambit of Kodak, which was decided four years after the 
district court's opinion in this case.   
 In Kodak, as we have already discussed, the Supreme Court 
held that when users are locked into a particular vendor by the 
sunk cost of the product, market power may exist in the 
aftermarket for parts even though the equipment market is 
competitive.  Here, while the district court found that large-
scale mainframes were generally reasonable substitutes for 
upgrades, its opinion did not address whether there was a 
subpopulation of IBM mainframe users who for economic reasons 
were locked into MIPS upgrades when they needed increased 
computing power.  AMI's argument appears to be that if a 
sufficient number of users actually were locked into using 
upgrades rather than replacing their computers, then IBM may have 
 
 
had the power to set prices for MIPS upgrades, wholly separate 
from whether it possessed that power over the large-scale 
mainframe market, including upgrades.  Under this reasoning, we 
should remand and allow the district court to determine the 
extent, if any, to which this was the case. 
 Such a remand would be futile, however, since if IBM had 
market power over upgrades with respect to a large number of 
mainframe users, we would expect it to charge supracompetitive 
prices for upgrades.  Yet, the district court found that IBM 
prices its upgrades such that the user pays the same amount for 
an upgrade as the price differential between the prices of the 
more powerful and the existing computers if purchased new.  
Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 282.  This belies any special power 
over an upgrade submarket; IBM's power is limited to whatever 
control it is able to maintain over the larger relevant market.  
Hence, we will affirm the district court's finding that a valid 
IBM-only parts submarket did not exist. 
 H. The "Significant Win/Loss Reports" 
 Additionally, AMI argues that the district court improperly 
rejected one of its strongest pieces of evidence in support of 
its proposed market definition, the "Significant Win/Loss 
Reports," also known as the SWLRs.  These reports were prepared 
monthly for the top management of IBM and showed, for each 
competitive situation IBM faced, IBM's product offering, the 
offering of its competitors, and whether IBM won or lost the 
sale.  See Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 272.  According to the 
testimony of AMI's expert who reviewed the SWLRs (Professor 
 
 
Levin), in 97.6 percent of the reported cases in which the IBM 
offering was a large-scale mainframe, the competitor's offering 
was also a large-scale mainframe or an upgrade.  AMI asserts that 
these reports proved that a distinct product market for large-
scale mainframe computers exists. 
 The district court rejected this evidence for several 
reasons.  First, it noted that IBM itself viewed the SWLRs as 
"poor and unrepresentative indicators of actual market activity" 
and eventually stopped using them.  Id. at 273.  In the 
alternative, it relied on the SWLRs themselves, which contained 
many examples in which non-IBM mainframes competed against IBM 
computers smaller than IBM mainframes.  The district court 
believed that this additional competition undermined AMI's 
definition of the relevant market. 
 Reports such as the SWLRs, which are used by IBM's 
management, can be powerful evidence in an antitrust case.  In 
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 
304 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam 347 U.S. 521, 74 S. Ct. 699 
(1954), the court stated: 
 When a business allows its own important judgments 
constantly to be affected by a statistical survey 
unflaggingly made, diligently kept current, and 
repeatedly consulted at least by subordinate advisers 
to the officers, then the statistical material may be 
used by a court to some degree as reliable evidence 
against the business. 
 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the potentially probative value of 
this type of evidence, there is nothing that requires courts to 
credit such evidence.  Here, as the district court pointed out, 
 
 
the record shows that IBM itself found the SWLRs were unreliable.  
As the trier of fact, the district court was entitled to credit 
that testimony and reject the SWLRs.17  Based on our conclusions 
about the relevant market and the various additions to it, 
however, it is possible that the district court may wish to 
reconsider the probative value, if any, of the SWLRs.  On remand, 
of course, it is free to do so.   
 IV. OTHER FACTORS BEARING ON MARKET POWER 
 Market share, of course, is only one type of evidence that 
may prove the defendant has sufficient market power to impose per 
se antitrust liability.  "Market share is just a way of 
estimating market power, which is the ultimate consideration.  
When there are better ways to estimate market power, the court 
should use them."  Ball Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. 
Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1986).  The district 
court, in addition to its findings on market share, also held 
that the lack of entry barriers and the rapid technological 
change of the computer industry independently precluded any 
finding of market power.   
                     
     17We do not accept the district court's alternative reason 
for discrediting the SWLRs.  Although it may well be true that in 
some circumstances non-IBM mainframes competed with smaller IBM 
computers, we must be aware of the true market inquiry in an 
antitrust tying case: can the defendant exercise market power 
over the tying product to restrain trade in the tied product 
market?  Although the above evidence could lead to the conclusion 
that the relevant market here is somewhat broader than mainframes 
only, a user seeking to avoid IBM's tie needs an alternative to 
an upgrade or a computer of the type it currently has installed.  
To the extent that the user needs more computing power, a smaller 
IBM computer would not appear to be much of a substitute. 
 
 
 A. Ease of Entry Into the Relevant Market 
 Notwithstanding the extent of an antitrust defendant's 
market share, the ease or difficulty with which competitors enter 
the market is an important factor in determining whether the 
defendant has true market power -- the power to raise prices. 
  In many cases a firm's share of current sales does 
indicate power. . . .  In other cases, however, a 
firm's share of current sales does not reflect an 
ability to reduce the total output in the market, and 
therefore it does not convey power over price. . . .  
[T]he lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the 
lags of new entry, the less power existing firms have.  
When the supply is highly elastic, existing market 
share does not signify power. 
Id. at 1335. 
 The district court relied on three pieces of evidence that 
purportedly showed that competitors were relatively free to enter 
the relevant market.  First, it noted:  
 A number of companies other than IBM manufacture a wide 
range of computers having the processing power of IBM 
large-scale mainframe computers.  Several of these 
(including Digital Equipment Corporation, Data General, 
Hewlett Packard, Tandem, and NCR) were admittedly 
excluded from the report upon which Prof. Levin relied 
to determine what constitute large-scale mainframes. 
Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 278. 
 This statement is somewhat ambiguous.  First, we have 
already noted that the district court may wish to reconsider the 
issue of whether the relevant market includes the smaller 
capacity computers these manufacturers produce in light of the 
Supreme Court's opinion in Kodak.  Thus, to the extent the court 
finds on remand that these computers do not belong in the 
relevant market, its conclusion will have to be re-evaluated.  
 
 
 More importantly, the district court's reasoning conflates 
ease of entry into the market with what belongs in the relevant 
market in the first instance.  Even if all the computers made by 
these manufacturers were properly included in the market, that 
would say nothing about how easy or difficult it currently is to 
enter the market.  It is conceivable that all these firms have 
been in the market for many years and that there has been very 
little recent entry.  To use an example from another industry, 
just because there may be a sizable number of steelmakers of 
various sizes and specialties, that does not necessarily make it 
easy to build a steel mill and enter the business today.  
Accordingly, the district court's finding of ease of market entry 
is not supported by the mere presence of these manufacturers of 
smaller capacity computers. 
 Second, the district court relied on the recent growth of 
leasing companies as evidence that the market was easy to enter.  
Again, we have already held that, except for certain leases of 
used, non-IBM computers, leasing companies do not belong in the 
relevant market.  Because of this, the ease of entry into the 
leasing market is legally irrelevant; if IBM has market power 
over the supply of large-scale mainframes, the immediate entry 
into the market of these essentially financial intermediaries can 
do nothing to increase the supply of such computers.  
Accordingly, leasing companies prove nothing about ease of entry 
into the relevant market here. 
 Finally, the district court cited the relative ease of entry 
into the computer reconfiguration business itself as evidence of 
 
 
a lack of barriers to market entry.  The question, however, in an 
antitrust tying case is whether the defendant can use its power 
over the tying product market to control the tied product market 
as well.  If IBM has market power over large-scale mainframes 
(including upgrade parts), that power could not be curtailed even 
to the slightest degree by the fact that it is easy to enter the 
tied market of installing upgrades.  Indeed, it seems likely that 
in most if not all tying cases, the tied product market will be 
competitive, otherwise the defendant would have no reason to 
impose the tie and restrain competition in the first place. 
 Accordingly, because the district court's reasons for 
finding ease of entry into the relevant market were erroneous, 
its finding that ease of entry vitiated IBM's market power cannot 
stand.   
 B. Technological Innovation and Declining Prices 
 The district court also believed that market power was 
inconsistent with the fact that technology in the computer 
industry was rapidly advancing. 
 Although the performance of computers has been rapidly 
increasing as costs for performance have plummeted, it proves too 
much to say that this improvement is inconsistent with market 
power.  Indeed, in Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM Corp., 559 
F.2d 488, 497 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040, 98 S. 
Ct. 782 (1978), another antitrust action brought against IBM and 
relied upon by the district court, the court stated: 
  IBM also contends that price reduction and product 
improvement are characteristics of the industry and are 
inconsistent with the existence of monopoly power.  But 
 
 
rapid technological progress may provide a climate 
favorable to increased concentration of market power 
rather than the opposite.  Moreover, a decline in 
prices does not necessarily imply an absence of 
monopoly power; a fair profit might have been made at 
even lower cost to users. 
 
559 F.2d at 497 (footnote omitted) (citing Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 
427).  Indeed, were we to accept the district court's reasoning, 
a great many defendants with market power, such as Alcoa in the 
1920s and perhaps even the former AT&T telephone monopoly, could 
be insulated from antitrust attack.  Here, technology was 
improving and prices were steadily falling, but the district 
court cited no evidence that these changes had any connection 
with a decrease in IBM's market power.  We hold that the district 
court erred when it ruled that innovation and price reductions 
precluded a finding of market power.18 
 C. Conclusion 
 Accordingly, we will vacate the district court's finding 
that IBM lacked sufficient market power for per se antitrust 
liability and remand for further proceedings, during which the 
district court should re-examine the issue de novo. 
 V. "VIABLE BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY" 
 In addition to finding that IBM lacked sufficient market 
power for per se liability to be imposed on it, the district 
court also found that AMI had not been foreclosed from a "viable 
business opportunity" by IBM's net pricing policy.  Allen-Myland, 
                     
     18We do not, however, hold as a matter of law that price 
reductions and technological improvements can never evidence a 
lack of market power.  Each case must be decided on its own 
facts, and facts must be found on the evidence presented. 
 
 
693 F. Supp. at 283.  The court found that the labor-saving 
advantages of TCM technology changed what had once been a 
lucrative reconfiguration business involving a great deal of 
added value into one whose labor content had become de minimis, 
averaging only 1.2 percent of the net upgrade price.  Id.  
According to the district court, because AMI would be required to 
inventory a supply of upgrade parts in order to compete with IBM, 
its carrying costs would be so high in comparison to its 
projected revenues from performing upgrades that AMI would have 
actually lost over $35 million if IBM had provided upgrades on 
non-net priced (SWRPQ) terms.  Id. at 288.  Accordingly, because 
the antitrust laws protect competition rather than competitors, 
the court held that net pricing was not worthy of condemnation 
under the antitrust laws. 
 There is no requirement that one be deprived of a "viable 
business opportunity" to recover under section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.  We instead interpret the district court as holding that AMI 
failed to prove the following two prongs of the orthodox 
framework for a section 1 tying case: first, that two separate 
markets existed for the tying and tied products; second, that a 
substantial volume of interstate commerce was affected by the 
tie.  Additionally, the district court's analysis appears to bear 
on the "fact of damage" issue of whether AMI has standing to 
bring a private antitrust suit against IBM.   
 A. Separate Product Markets 
   In Jefferson Parish, the Supreme Court said that, in a tying 
case, "the answer to the question whether one or two products are 
 
 
involved turns not on the functional relation between them, but 
rather on the character of the demand for the two items."  466 
U.S. at 19, 104 S. Ct. at 1562.  It then went on to hold that a 
tying arrangement cannot exist unless there is a sufficient 
demand for the purchase of the tied product separate from the 
purchase of the tying product so as to identify a market 
structure in which it is efficient to offer the tied product 
separately from the tying product.  Id. at 21-22, 104 S. Ct. at 
1563.  There, the tying product was hospital services and the 
tied product was anesthesiological services; because on the facts 
presented, there was evidence of separate patient demands for 
specific anesthesiologists, the Court held that separate markets 
existed.  Id. at 22, 24, 104 S. Ct. at 1564-65. 
 At least at one time, there was a demand for third-party 
installations of upgrades separate from the demand for parts; the 
successful operation of AMI's business before IBM imposed its net 
pricing policy is conclusive evidence of that.  The district 
court, however, believed that TCM technology, not net pricing, 
destroyed the separate market for AMI's labor, finding: (1) that 
customers would not be willing to have upgrades installed by AMI 
at any price higher than what IBM would charge if forced to 
provide the service; and (2) that, at the IBM price, AMI would 
lose massive amounts of money if it attempted to install upgrades 
in the same way as before net pricing.  Allen-Myland, 693 F. 
Supp. at 283-91. 
 1. Customer Willingness to Pay Premium Prices 
 
 
 The district court credited the testimony of end-user 
witnesses who said they had no interest in having upgrades 
installed by a third party such as AMI.  It then went on to 
acknowledge that representatives of leasing companies did 
indicate an interest in third-party installation, but only at 
prices competitive with IBM's net price.  Id. at 290. 
 The court properly found that, with a few adjustments, IBM 
would charge $165 per hour for installing upgrades.  Id. at 287.  
AMI takes strong exception to the next logical step in the 
court's reasoning: that AMI would not be able to charge its 
customers any more than IBM for its services.  We are convinced 
by AMI's argument. 
 At trial, two leasing company witnesses testified that they 
would not be interested in paying AMI significantly more than 
IBM's effective hourly rate for installation of upgrades.  
Comdisco's Mr. Lewis said that he would use AMI installation 
service only if it were, at most, slightly more expensive than 
IBM's price.  Id. at 291.  On cross examination, however, he 
admitted that AMI had performed an "E to B" upgrade at an 
effective hourly rate of $2,400 and admitted that such an amount 
(thought by counsel to be $1,500 per hour) was more than slightly 
greater than IBM's price.  See id. at 291 & n.75.  The district 
court, irrespective of this contradiction, opined: 
 Mr. Lewis of Comdisco explained that he would use AMI 
installation service only if it were "lesser than, the 
same as, or in rare exceptions, only a slight premium 
above the prevailing IBM list price."  Using an E to B 
upgrade as an example, Mr. Lewis testified that he 
would not regard an AMI hourly rate of $1500 for 
 
 
installation service as only slightly greater than an 
IBM hourly rate of $180 or $200. 
 
Id. at 291 (record citation omitted).  In a footnote, the court 
continued: 
 Using customer-owned parts, AMI charged Comdisco 
between $25,000 and $30,000 for installing an E to B 
upgrade, requiring approximately 20 man hours.  Based 
on Mr. Ross's calculations, the value of IBM 
installation service for an E to B upgrade, requiring 
about 13 man hours of labor, is $2,400.  Based on these 
facts and Mr. Lewis' assertions, it is fair to conclude 
that Comdisco would not select AMI over IBM to install 
a new E to B upgrade if it had the choice. In view of 
this evidence, I do not accept AMI's assertion at 
closing argument that leasing companies "don't care 
whether the service costs $2400 or $20,000." 
 
Id. at 291 n.75 (record citations omitted).  We conclude that 
this finding, at least as supported by the district court's 
opinion, is clearly erroneous.  The court did not adequately 
address why, if Comdisco was unwilling to pay anything more than 
a slight premium over IBM's rate, it paid not $165 per hour, but 
a full $2,400 hourly rate.  Its statement, that Comdisco would 
never pay the $2,400 rate if it "had the choice," is true enough, 
but explains nothing; we would all like to pay the lowest 
possible price whenever we purchase goods and services.  On the 
other hand, AMI's explanation for its ability to charge a higher 
price is supported: IBM commonly took so long to price and 
perform upgrades that the leasing companies' losses from having 
their machines idle exceeded the premium charged by AMI -- which 
was often able to complete the job within a few days.19 
                     
     19We again stress, however, that we cannot and will not 
substitute our view of the facts for that of the district court.  
We hold only that the district court's finding of fact is not 
 
 
 In a similar vein, "Mr. Smith of CMI testified that, other 
things being equal, he did not wish to pay 10, 20 or 30 times 
more than necessary to obtain installation service."  Id. at 291.  
For the reasons stated above, this does not show that CMI, under 
certain special circumstances such as the need for fast 
turnaround, would be unwilling to pay a considerable premium, 
even if under normal conditions it would pay only the IBM rate.  
This finding too cannot stand as presently supported. 
 2. Alleged Lack of Demand for Third-Party Installation 
  The district court additionally supported its finding of 
lack of demand for AMI-installed upgrades by referring to 
evidence that, in the few occasions in which IBM had made SWRPQ 
pricing available for MIPS upgrades, there were few such upgrades 
sold without IBM labor.  The court reasoned as follows: 
  There is insufficient evidence of demand for 
upgrade labor at prices AMI would have to charge to 
support a conclusion that a competitive market for 308X 
upgrade labor does or could exist.  Leasing companies 
have purchased virtually no 308X model, memory, or 
channel upgrades without IBM labor included (in order, 
for instance, to have AMI install the upgrade) when 
such upgrades were available on an SWRPQ basis (which 
roughly equals the price IBM would be entitled to 
charge for its parts).  Every J to K upgrade purchased 
by CMI and Comdisco was bought with IBM installation 
service included even though IBM also sold the feature 
on an SWRPQ basis. 
 
Id. at 290-91 (footnotes and record citations omitted).  In a 
footnote, the court responded to AMI's argument that the reason 
                                                                  
adequately supported by the elaboration contained in its opinion.  
On remand, the court may of course re-examine this issue and 
again reach the same conclusion, if it is supported by sufficient 
evidence and findings of fact. 
 
 
there were so few SWRPQ orders was that the unbundled prices were 
not well-publicized: 
 Witnesses from CMI and Comdisco testified that neither 
company knew that IBM sold upgrades (including the J to 
K) without IBM labor included.  I do not credit such 
testimony, as there was documentary evidence (requests 
for IBM "SW" prices) to the contrary.  Further, the 
SWRPQ procedure has existed since 1975.  SWRPQ prices 
are readily available from IBM.  AMI acknowledged that 
SWRPQ prices are made available from IBM when 
specifically requested.   
 
Id. at 291 n.74.  (record cites omitted)  AMI argues that this 
determination was based on insupportable impeachments of 
witnesses and was clearly erroneous. 
 Mr. Lewis, Vice-President of Comdisco, the largest leasing 
company, admitted that, as of the trial date, he knew that IBM 
installation was not mandatory.  He was then cross-examined on 
the issue of one particular 308X MIPS upgrade, the J to K model 
conversion.  He then stated that he acquired nine such upgrades 
in the past, all with IBM labor included.  But when asked whether 
he knew that IBM installation was optional at the time he 
purchased the J to K upgrades, he said he did not.  Quite simply,  
 
Lewis' admission does not impeach his testimony that he was 
unaware of SWRPQ pricing during the relevant time period. 
 The district court then used certain documentary evidence to 
impeach Lewis.  DX 2260 is a request from Lewis for SWRPQ pricing 
on three upgrades, J16-J24, K16-K24 and G16-G24.  None of these 
are the J-K upgrade that Lewis testified about at trial.  
Moreover, their designations are consistent with memory upgrades, 
 
 
not MIPS upgrades.20  DX 2266 is more explicit, specifically 
stating that memory upgrades are involved.  308X memory was 
usually neither TCM-based nor subject to net pricing and is thus 
not at issue.  Accordingly, the conclusion to be drawn from this 
evidence is that Lewis was unaware that MIPS upgrades were SWRPQ-
priced, although he had purchased some unrelated memory upgrades 
without IBM installation in the past.  Lewis' testimony that he 
was unaware of SWRPQ pricing for 308X MIPS upgrades was not 
impeached.  Therefore, nothing can be concluded from Comdisco's 
failure to purchase MIPS upgrades under SWRPQ terms other than it 
was unaware they were available. 
 The district court also noted the testimony of Mr. Loria, a 
CMI Vice-President.  He testified that, to his knowledge, IBM 
would not sell upgrades without a labor charge.  Much of this 
testimony centered on the year 1976, years before IBM introduced 
the 308X series of computers.  He also stated that he thought 
that SWRPQ terms meant simply that IBM did not retain the old 
parts.  Except for the J-K upgrade, the only SWRPQ upgrades he 
testified about were not MIPS upgrades. 
 The district court believed that this testimony was 
impeached by three exhibits, DX 2261, DX 2262 and DX 2263.  DX 
2261, however, is just a 1986 request for SWRPQ pricing on a 96 
                     
     20308X model numbers appear to be classified as follows:  
308X-YMM; where X is the CPU family, e.g., 3081, 3083, 3084; Y is 
the CPU power indicator within the family, e.g., 3081-J, 3081-K; 
and MM is the main memory in megabytes, e.g., 3081-J16, 3081-J24.  
This is consistent with the numbering scheme for memory upgrades 
in DX 2266. 
 
 
to 128 megabyte memory upgrade; Loria never testified that non-
net priced memory upgrades did not exist.  DX 2262 and DX 2263 
are IBM's responses to CMI requests for SWRPQ-priced memory 
upgrades.  None of these documents tend to show that Loria knew 
that a few MIPS upgrades were available without IBM installation; 
accordingly, his testimony to the contrary was not impeached by 
this evidence. 
 Another Vice-President of CMI, a Mr. Smith, testified 
similarly to Loria, stating that he was not aware that the J to K 
MIPS upgrade was available without IBM installation.  The 
district court found that DX 2265 impeached Smith's testimony.  
That document is a computer printout of requests for price 
quotations ("RPQs") with the name "Gary Smith" handwritten at the 
top.  Some of these RPQs were for SWRPQ terms, but none were for 
MIPS upgrades.  Once again, this evidence does not impeach 
Smith's testimony. 
 In short, that to which the district court refers does not 
bear out its conclusion that these witnesses were untruthful when 
they claimed not to know of a few MIPS upgrades without IBM 
installation.21  Thus, the fact that a few MIPS upgrades were 
                     
     21In addition, the district court relied on the fact that 
the SWRPQ procedure has existed since 1975, that "SWRPQ prices 
are readily available from IBM," and that AMI acknowledged this 
fact.  This all appears to be true, in general, but there is no 
indication in the portions of the record cited by the court below 
that these facts impeached the testimony of the Comdisco and CMI 
witnesses that they were unaware of SWRPQ-priced MIPS upgrades 
for 308X series computers.  That these prices were available for 
memory upgrades and for earlier series of computers could not 
have reasonably put these witnesses on notice that a very small 
number of SWRPQ-priced MIPS upgrades were made available for the 
308X series, given IBM's well-publicized policy of net pricing. 
 
 
sold under SWRPQ terms does not prove that there was no separate 
demand for installation services, particularly considering that 
IBM had every economic incentive to protect its revenues and 
avoid widely publicizing the existence of such upgrades. 
 3.  AMI's "Massive Losses" From Inventory Costs 
 In addition to finding that AMI would attract no customers 
at the price the court believed it would have to charge for its 
service, the district court also found that AMI would suffer 
massive losses at the IBM hourly rate.  It based this conclusion 
on its belief that AMI would have to maintain an inventory of 
expensive upgrade parts to provide adequate turnaround time.  
Because IBM's revenues would average only 1.2 percent of the net 
price for the upgrade and its carrying costs for the parts 
inventory would average 3 percent, the district court concluded 
that AMI stood to lose over $35 million by competing with IBM.  
Id. at 288.  Although the court acknowledged that AMI's principal 
argument was that leasing companies inventoried their own parts 
and thus saved AMI the costs of doing so, it nevertheless 
included these carrying costs when calculating AMI's ability to 
make a profit, based on a purported admission by AMI. 
 It is, of course, true that AMI would have to carry an 
inventory of parts to give its customers fast turnaround on 
upgrade installations.  This is exactly what AMI did for the 
earlier 303X series of computers.  The exception would be if the 
customer itself maintained an inventory of parts.  Thus, to the 
extent AMI intended to compete for the business of end-users, who 
typically do not inventory parts, AMI would have to maintain an 
 
 
inventory, which would be presumably unprofitable given the 
revenue generated by the installation.  Leasing companies, on the 
other hand, constituted over 90 percent of AMI's business and 
were known to inventory their own parts.  So, while the 
relatively minuscule end-user business may have been foreclosed 
from AMI by the low margins generated by TCM-based upgrades, the 
business from leasing companies was not. 
 It would be both a non-sequitur and clearly erroneous on its 
face to find that AMI's argument that leasing companies would 
inventory their own parts and relieve AMI of that cost is invalid 
solely because AMI admitted it will incur such costs on its own 
inventory.  The district court, however, relied on its belief 
that Mr. Allen admitted that AMI would incur inventory costs if 
it were permitted to compete in the market of 308X net priced 
upgrades.  Id. at 288-89.  The record contains the following 
exchange: 
 Q. And according to Mr. Hamilton's report on damages, 
he indicates that you have told him that AMI must 
maintain a certain worth of inventory of upgrades and 
parts, and that a fair estimate of AMI's carrying costs 
for that inventory, just for the carrying costs of the 
interest involved is approximately three percent of 
IBM's price, whatever you happen to pay for those 
parts.   
 
  Did you tell Professor Hamilton that, sir? 
 
 A. I identified for Professor Hamilton, when he was 
doing a damage study, he asked me, if you were 
permitted to compete in this market of net priced MESs, 
what would be your costs?   
 
  I identified it would be AMI's intent, similar to 
the volume procurement agreement, to order many parts 




  There was a question whether these parts would 
come from the parts center on a very rapid response or 
whether AMI would have to inventory, virtually millions 
of dollars of inventory.   
 
  From going on prior experience with the VPA, where 
we ordered large quantities for inventory and were not 
using the parts center, he said, wouldn't you have some 
type of carrying charges?   
 
  Now, that number that he picked of three percent 
was if the prime rate were 12 percent. . . .   
 
  I don't know further the -- all the economic data 
in regard to what -- Mr. Hamilton went further from 
that, but the question was asked. 
 
 On the next page of the transcript, Allen then stated that 
as long as upgrade parts could arrive quickly from the IBM Parts 
Center, there would be no need for AMI to maintain an inventory.  
This "admission," (Allen stated only that the question was 
asked), does not admit that AMI would be required to carry an 
inventory for all of its customers.  It was therefore 
insufficient grounds upon which to conclude that inventory costs  
 
 
must be included in every situation in which AMI does business.22 
                     
     22Earlier in its opinion, the district court found that 
Allen had admitted that AMI could not make a profit on a labor 
value of 1.2 percent of the net upgrade price.  Allen-Myland, 693 
F. Supp. at 284.  The trial testimony shows that counsel for IBM 
asked Allen whether he would take on an upgrade for $25,500 labor 
charge when the net price was $2,090,000, a 1.2% margin.  Allen 
replied that he would, and that he thought it was a viable 
business opportunity.  Counsel then tried to impeach him with a 
letter he wrote to IBM in the context of settlement negotiations.  
On the witness stand, Allen admitted the existence of this letter 
but claimed that counsel was taking it out of context.  We do not 
think this letter can be fairly read to concede that AMI could 
never make a profit on a 1.2 percent margin.  Like the statement 
 
 
 4. Low Margins and Separate Markets 
 The district court also found that the value of the labor 
content of 308X MIPS upgrades was de minimis for antitrust 
purposes.  Id. at 283.  Later, it referred to another purported 
admission by AMI's counsel, to the effect that, if the labor 
content of upgrades was de minimis, then parts and labor would 
have to be considered a single market.  Id. at 289 n.71.   
 To the extent it might be argued that AMI admitted that a 
1.2 percent margin caused parts and installation to fold into one 
market, as a matter of law we cannot agree.  The record indicates 
that the total value of all 308X MIPS upgrades performed between 
1981 and 1985 was over $2 billion.  1.2 percent of a $2 billion 
market amounts to over $20 million.  See Allen-Myland, 693 F. 
Supp. at 292.  This amount is not de minimis within the meaning 
of the antitrust laws.  See Fortner I, 394 U.S. at 501-02, 89 S. 
Ct. at 1257-58 ($190,000 not considered de minimis by the Supreme 
Court). 
 5. Conclusion 
 The district court's finding that no separate market existed 
for installations of upgrades cannot stand.  We will accordingly 
vacate it and remand for further proceedings.  On remand, the 
district should re-examine the issue de novo. 
 B. Substantial Volume of Commerce 
                                                                  
discussed in the above text, it admits no more than that, to the 
extent AMI must buy and inventory the parts, it cannot earn a 




 As part of its "viable business opportunity" inquiry, the 
district court also found that AMI had not proved that IBM's 
tying arrangement foreclosed a substantial volume of commerce.  
Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 292-93.  Although the court 
acknowledged that the $20 million market for upgrade 
installations was quantitatively more than sufficient, it found 
that AMI had not shown "that it engaged in an activity foreclosed 
by IBM's net pricing."  Id.  The district court believed that it 
was the changes brought about by the 308X's TCM technology, not 
net pricing, that foreclosed AMI from the upgrade business.  
Thus, according to the court, competition with IBM in the 
installation of upgrades had become unprofitable because of 
advancing technology, quite apart from any anticompetitive 
effects of the tie. 
 First of all, to the extent the district court based this 
conclusion on its findings that AMI lacked a viable business 
opportunity, it necessarily erred.  We have already pointed out 
the factual and analytical errors behind those conclusions.  
Although we do not decide those factual issues ourselves, it 
appears likely from this record on appeal that AMI could have 
successfully performed upgrades and made a profit in the absence 
of net pricing; at least, the district court's findings that no 
one would pay AMI any more than IBM and that AMI would be 
burdened with across-the-board inventory costs were not supported 
by the evidence it cited. 
 Second, and more importantly, there is no requirement that 
an antitrust plaintiff show profitability in addition to showing 
 
 
some foreclosure of commerce.  If the competition foreclosed by a 
tying arrangement had to be profitable, then many anticompetitive 
tying arrangements would be immunized from antitrust attack.  For 
example, a new competitor attempting to break into a dominated 
market might well lose money for a time, either because of 
aggressive introductory pricing or because its sales had not yet 
grown to the point where economies of scale made its production 
operations sufficiently inexpensive to turn a profit.  Yet, the 
defendant could exploit its market power with impunity on the 
ground that the plaintiff could not profitably compete against 
it, and continue using that power to keep all new competitors out 
of the tied market.  Such a result would be contrary to the 
purpose of the antitrust laws.  Accordingly, we hold that the 
district court erred when it found that a substantial amount of 




 C. Fact of Damage 
 An antitrust plaintiff must also prove what is known as 
"fact of damage," defined as harm of a type which the antitrust 
laws were designed to prevent.  See supra typescript at 10.  The 
district court declined to rule on this issue, but noted that its 
earlier findings that AMI was not deprived of a viable business 
opportunity seemed to preclude any finding that AMI suffered the 
requisite damage.  Allen-Myland, 693 F. Supp. at 298.  We, of 
course, make no finding, but observe that the district court's 
 
 
errors on what it termed the business opportunity issue call its 
tentative conclusion on fact of damage into question as well.  
The matter remains, however, an issue for that court to resolve 
in the first instance. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
 We will accordingly vacate the district court's judgment in 
favor of IBM and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
 
 
 
